law decisions, is unlikely to articulate."" This Note therefore proposes that Congress enact a choice of law statute enabling and directing federal courts presiding over mass tort litigation to make choice of law decisions that will promote both equity and efficiency.
The equity concerns beneath this proposal are twofold. First, current law often precludes equity among plaintiffs in mass tort suits because different substantive laws likely will be applied to identical claims of similarly situated parties. Equity among plaintiffs requires that a single rule of decision apply to all like claims. 12 Second, from society's point of view, equity requires that victims of mass torts receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for their injuries. 1 3 Thus, within certain limits, the proposed statute set forth in Section III requires that a court select the most favorable substantive law available to plaintiffs. 4 This Note also addresses two types of efficiency in mass tort litigation. First, the proposed statute removes choice of law barriers that discourage the use of collective adjudication in mass torts and thereby deny mass tort litigation the numerous judicial efficiencies that collective adjudication can offer. 1 Second, by eliminating the requirement that a federal court follow several state choice of law rules, the proposed statute eliminates the inefficiencies this burden places on the court's choice of law decision. 6 follow state conflicts rule). The Court's due process analyses generally focus on the fairness to the defendant of the choice of law decision under review and do not address the equitable treatment of plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court has not measured choice of law decisions against the efficiency concerns raised in this Note. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court has never reviewed a choice of law decision in a mass accident case.
11. Indeed, the Court's terse reversal in Day & Zimmermann supports this assumption. In that case, an injured serviceman and the estate of a deceased serviceman sought recovery of damages based on the premature explosion of a howitzer round in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. A lower federal court sitting in diversity had declined to follow Texas' lex loci delicti choice of law rule on the theory that Cambodia, the place of the wrong, had "no interest in the case, no policy at stake." The Court, however, rejected the lower court's innovative approach, stating, "A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state [conflict of laws] rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits." 423 U.S. at 4. The Court's position evinces a manifest reluctance to prescribe the choice of law principles this Note argues are essential to fair and efficient mass tort adjudication.
12. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
See infra note 41 and accompanying text.

16.
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
II. MASS TORT CHOICE OF LAW DECISIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW
A
. An Illustration of the Problem
Consider the hypothetical case of a commercial airplane crash in State A during a flight from State B to State C.17 Representatives of deceased passengers file wrongful death actions against the plane manufacturer alleging inadequate instructions in the manufacturer's operating manual for the plane. 1 8 The manufacturer built the plane in State B but is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in State E. The plaintiffs are from four states, A through D. Although some plaintiffs from all four states file initially in State A,' 9 the majority file suit in their respective states of residence. 20 The choice of law rules, liability standards for 17 . The illustration in the text is based upon the air crash disaster cases cited above. See supra note 3. Although the choice of law problems presented by this hypothetical are considerable, the simplification of the issues and analyses that was necessary to condense these cases into a useful and intelligible example actually obscures some complexity. The actual cases involve considerably more states, countries, issues, and varied choice of law rules.
For example, in Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 742 (C.D. Cal. 1975) , the federal court, upon considering the choice of law rules of the twelve states from which the claims before it had been consolidated, found that five states followed a "significant contacts" analysis, sometimes interchangeably with the "governmental-interest" or "public-interest" approach, six followed lex loci delicti, and one, California, relied exclusively on the "governmental-interest" approach. Focusing on the substantive rules uncovered by this multifaceted choice of law analysis, the court found that the measure of damages recoverable also varied: "One state limits the amount to $50,000; another, to $75,000; four allow full recovery with varying limitations; one has full recovery plus pain and suffering and mental anguish; and five use 'compensatory' and, in some instances, 'pecuniary' [as the standard for recovery]." Id. Applying these disparate laws would have been "chaotic, and against the faintest instinct for justice by [meting out] unequal results to those standing in the same relationship to each other and to the decedent." Id. at 741.
Relying upon the Fifth Circuit's not-then-overruled decision in Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), rev 'd, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) Table I are discussed infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
22. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) .
23. "When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982) . Transfer under § 1407(a) may be made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation upon the panel's own initiative or by motion filed with the panel by a party. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (1982) .
24. A general rule of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is that the most efficient and expeditious resolution of domestic air disaster litigation is best achieved by transferring all actions to the district of the situs of the crash. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Natchitoches Parish, La. on Sept. 20, 1973 , 407 F. Supp. 1401 , 1402 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976 .
Although § 1407 was intended to apply only to pre-trial proceedings, Rule 11(b) of the Panel's Rules of Procedure gives the transferee court the authority to transfer all cases to itself for all purposes under § 1404. R. PROC. J.P.M.D.L. 11(b), 28 U.S.C. fol. § 1407 (1982) . Thus, in practice, most multidistrict cases are disposed of in a single court. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Duarte, Cal., on June 6, 1971 , 357 F. Supp. 1013 , 1016 (C.D. Cal. 1973 ) (explaining transferee court's § 1404 transfer of all actions to itself on grounds that remanding actions to different transferor courts "may produce different results in different districts. Such a result in this case is certainly 'not in the interest of justice' "); see also In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Moreover the pretrial proceedings encompassed by § 1407 include summary judgment, and history has indicated that once the limited transfer has occurred, the transferor district is not likely to see the case again."); D. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 211 (1986) Professor Weintraub offers an interesting argument critical of the requirement that a § 1404 transferee court look to the law of the transferor district by noting that "the plaintiff is not 'traditionally' entitled to select an inconvenient forum. But for the flexibility that 1404(a) provides when the plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum, the sanction might be dismissal of the complaint and with it the plaintiff's advantage in being able to select his law with his forum." Weintraub, supra note 8, at 258-59. On the other hand, deference to the law of the transferee court might create an unfair forumshopping advantage for defendants. Consistent with the thesis of this Note, the best solution would be to let the transferee district court make its own determination as to which state's law is most appropriate.
27. Van Dusen has been interpreted to require the transferee court to follow the choice of law rules of the transferor court. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984 REV. 1233 REV. , 1242 REV. -43 (1963 . Under Professor Currie's "governmental-interest" analysis, a court's determination of whether a state has an interest in having its law applied requires analysis of the policies underlying the particular law.
29. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (applying New York law instead of Canadian guest statute where car accident occurred in Canada but both parties were New York residents). Interest analysis places near-exclusive reliance on domicile or residence as an interest-generating factor. This is apparent from the most significant contribution of interest analysis to the choice of law field: namely, the identification of "false conflicts"-cases in which, because opposing parties are residents of the same state, only that state is likely to have an interest in having its law applied. Claims Brought Originally in State C: Under the traditional rule of lex loci delicti, followed in State C, a court looks to the law of the "state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort" took place. 5 Thus, the transferee court would find that a State C court 31. Currie, supra note 28, at 1242-43 ("If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.").
32. This illustration assumes that the states' limited recovery laws impose the same limit on recovery. Were this not the case, a court would still probably not find a true conflict and would apply the recovery limit of the claimant's state. See Currie, supra note 28, at 1242 (suggesting "more moderate and restrained interpretation of [one state's] policy or interest" in cases of "apparent conflict"). 35. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 377-379 (1934) . Prior to the revolution in choice of law during the 1950's and 1960's, the substantive law of the place of injury, lex loci delicti, universally governed the rights and liabilities of parties to a tort suit.
would apply State A's negligence and unlimited recovery laws to the claims originally filed in State C.
Claims Brought Originally in State D: Professor Baxter's comparative impairment analysis attempts to resolve true conflicts by considering which of the interested states' policies would be impaired most by application of another state's law. 6 The laws of States D and E differ only as to standards of liability. Considering that the purpose underlying a rule of strict liability may be twofold, 37 a State D court would probably hold that State D's policy in favor of facilitating recovery by tort victims against manufacturers would suffer more harm were its law not applied for the benefit of its residents than would State E's interest in protecting its resident corporations from excessive liability were its law rejected., Thus, the transferee court would apply State D's strict liability and limited recovery laws to the claims originally filed in State D."
The following chart summarizes the findings of the transferee court: 
B. Current Law Does Not Achieve Equity or Efficiency
The common claims of victims of single-incident mass torts are increasingly resolved through some form of collective adjudication. 40 In theory, 36 . See Baxter, supra note 8. 37. A state may impose strict liability on tortfeasors both to deter harmful conduct and to facilitate recovery by tort victims.
38. Cf Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333, 346-47, 351 (D.D.C. 1983 ) (noting, without finding controlling, Washington State's legislatively expressed interest in providing fair treatment and protection for its resident corporations).
39. Cf Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1114 (D. Mass. 1975 ) (Massachusetts' interest in deterring harmful conduct and limiting liability of defendant doing business within its borders "materially and substantially less than that of New Hampshire in adequately providing for survivors of its own resident decedents").
40. Single-incident mass torts produce claims that squarely fit the consolidation requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and are routinely collected in a single forum. The Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 Ct. (1985 , increases the likelihood that such claims will be brought as class actions, See Miller & Crump, supra note 9; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
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collective adjudication is more efficient because it minimizes the time and resources expended by courts, facilitates and expedites the settlement of claims, and avoids concurrent or sequential resolutions of claims arising from the same set of facts. 4 ' Moreover, collective adjudication theoretically is more equitable because it avoids disparate recoveries by injured parties and inconsistent standards of conduct for tortfeasors, 42 reduces inequalities in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants, 4 ' 3 and lowers the risk that early claimants will deplete available compensation funds and cause an inequitable allocation of compensatory and punitive damages."
In practice, however, as the hypothetical case illustrates, choice of law problems derail the equity and efficiency advantages that collective adjudi- L. REv. 1787 L. REv. (1983 .
41. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 9: When many injuries are traceable to a single incident, almost all liability inquiries, including most questions of specific causation, are focused on an event that occurred at a definite time and place. As a result, gains in both efficiency and equity from group resolution may be greater than in other mass tort cases. Id. at 44; see also Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases, supra note 40, at 1144-46 (discussing efficiency gains from collective adjudication).
From a judicial perspective, efficiency frequently means collective adjudication of cases presenting common questions of law or fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982) (authorizing transfer for consolidated pre-trial proceedings of actions involving one or more common questions of fact); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 548 F. Supp. 1268 (J.P.M.D.L. 1982) (citing promotion of just and efficient conduct of litigation as support for § 1407 transfer). From a claimant's perspective, efficiency often means lower litigation costs through quick resolution by settlement or trial. For a mass tort litigant, such efficiencies may be realized through greater use of class actions and coordinated representation. Finally, the efficient result for society can be measured by whether and to what extent the legal system's resolution of an issue encourages behavior that will in the long run reduce the total costs of accidents to society. See generally G. (1970 Ct. 2965 Ct. (1985 , where the Court reversed on due process grounds a Kansas court's application of Kansas' substantive law to all plaintiffs in a nationwide class action. The Court held that Kansas did not have sufficient contacts with the out-of-state claims to warrant the application of its law to all claims. The Court did not, however, suggest that uniform application of a single state's law would be impermissible where sufficient contacts were present.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
47. In this way equity among like claimants is violated. Cf. Boston Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975) . There the transferee district court found that the various forms of interest analysis-"significant contacts," "substantial contacts," "domicile of decedent," and "public policy"-of Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and Florida, respectively, pointed to the substantive law of the state of domicile to govern the claims initially filed in each state. Together with the application of lex loci delicti to those claims originally filed in Massachusetts, the court's choice of law decisions effectively limited the damages recoverable by some of the crash victims without limiting the damages available to others. Id. at 1115; see also supra note 17 (discussing potential for inequitable result in Paris Air Crash).
48. Presiding over a similar situation, the district court judge in the Chicago Air Crash case commented:
It is unjust as well as ludicrous that such issues as the standard of liability (no-fault, comparative negligence, contributory negligence), the measure of damages, [and] whether . . . damages for pain and suffering are recoverable . . . should vary from case to case arising out of the same disaster depending on the vagaries of the applicable state law. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979 , 526 F. Supp. 226, 233 (N.D. I11. 1981 .
49. Thus, current choice of law decisionmaking does not achieve equitable results for mass tort victims as a group.
Society's desire to compensate tort victims fairly and adequately can be seen in several recent legal Equal treatment of similar claims is a fundamental principle of American law. 5 0 Counterbalancing this principle of equality is the delegation of substantial lawmaking authority to the individual states within our federal system. 51 Because states have different laws on many issues, a litigant suing in one state may often recover while his counterpart suing in a neighboring state on a similar transaction does not. It is one thing to contemplate the disparate ways different state laws may resolve a given dispute; it is quite another to accept such disparities in the context of a mass tort suit consolidated in a single forum adjudicating, for example, the identical claims of passengers sitting side by side aboard an airplane. 2 Unlike the victims of single-incident mass torts, non-mass tort victims do not share all the characteristics that largely determine which legal rules will apply to their claims. 5 " Nor does the adjudication of their claims trigger the federal interest raised by multistate mass torts. 54 On the other developments. The movement in tort law toward unrestricted recovery has led to the relative disuse of such anti-recovery doctrines as assumption of risk and contributory negligence as complete bars to recovery and to the expansion of strict liability across a range of issues in products liability. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (listing expanding range of products that carry strict liability).
The arguments for unlimited compensation carry even greater weight in the context of mass torts. The victims of mass accidents ordinarily have no control over what happens to them and thus cannot be said to possess the responsibility traits upon which rules that limit or wholly deny recovery partially rely:
The decedents bought a ticket, got on a plane, and were killed. Not only did they have nothing to do with the relationships between the defendants, but they had no way of finding them out or learning of any acts or efforts of defendants to correct or prevent defects in the plane or its parts, or not to do so. 417-18 (1964) (criticizing application of different state laws to mass tort suits as producing "seeming injustice that the estate of one passenger might recover without limit whereas that of the man sitting next to him could get only a small sum").
53. Although mass tort victims also are not alike in all respects-e.g., they may be from different states-the characteristics to which the text refers are the individual tort victim's active traits that a court would consider to resolve a question of contributory negligence or causation. These so-called active traits would, by definition, see supra note 1, be the same for single-incident, multistate mass tort victims. Cf. supra note 49 (mass tort victims have little control over accident causing injury).
54. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
hand, the inherently interstate nature of the accidents that harm mass tort victims and the commonality of the victims' factual claims both raise an interest in, and permit the realization of, unified recovery standards. Thus, society's interest and the interests of individual victims in the integrity of mass tort adjudication require that the principles of equity advanced in this Note override competing values of federalism in mass tort litigation. 55
III. CONGRESS' ROLE IN REMOVING THE CHOICE OF LAW IMPASSE
Lower federal courts face two major obstacles to fair and efficient choice of law decisionmaking in mass tort litigation: a melange of biased and rigid state choice of law rules 56 and Supreme Court decisions that compel application of those rules in diversity suits. 57 The present situation is unlikely to change without congressional action.
A. A Judicial Solution is Unlikely
State Choice of Law Doctrine
Analysis of state choice of law rules incorporating the modern approach 5 " 8 reveals why those rules are unlikely to produce equity and efficiency in mass tort litigation. First, as the example in Section I demonstrates, the heavy emphasis that interest analysis places on domicile requires a federal court presiding over a mass tort suit to consider the substantive laws of several states. 59 Because state laws often vary, this requirement virtually ensures that different laws will govern similar claims. In addition, the greater the number of states represented by the claimants, 55. Cf Miller & Grump, supra note 9, at 71 (federalism benefits of non-collective adjudication "hardly would be worthwhile" if there is risk of insufficient or no recovery by injured parties 58. The focus in this section is on interest analysis. The rule of lex loci delicti certainly forecloses biases in favor of both domicile and forum law. Thus, if all states adhered to the traditional rule, many of the choice of law problems federal courts face in mass accident litigation would be eliminated, albeit at the cost of any overall strategy to improve mass tort adjudication. The legal system can, and should be encouraged to, do better. The crux of the choice of law dilemma in mass tort suits is the mix of choice rules applied, not the difficulty of the principled inquiry some modern rules require. A choice of law solution for mass tort suits should not retreat to the traditional rule; rather, it should incorporate in workable form some of the insights modern choice methods have advanced.
59. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
the more unmanageable will be the court's task in organizing and following numerous different bodies of complex substantive principles." 0 Second, the tendency of state courts to favor forum law reinforces the emphasis that interest analysis places on domicile. Professor Currie felt-with some resignation-that the selection of forum law is the inevitable resolution of true conflicts."' Modifications of Professor Currie's approach have failed to offset the bias toward forum law. 2 Under the "comparative impairment" approach, the court hearing the case can more easily assess, and hence is more sympathetic to, the detrimental effects to its state's sovereignty should its law be ignored than the harm to another state if the latter's law is rejected." 3 Similarly, under the "better law" component of Professor Leflar's choice-influencing-factors approach, a state court is naturally inclined to feel that its law is the better one. 64
Federal Choice of Law Doctrine
Although its decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co." 3 has received much scholarly criticism, 6 6 the Supreme Court recently reiterated the obligation of federal courts to follow the choice of law rules of the states in which they sit. 67 As in Klaxon, the Court's narrow focus 60. Cf Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 64 (discussing court's heavy burden in 50-state action). 61. See Currie, supra note 28, at 1242-43 (containing Currie's advice for resolution of true conflicts): § 4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests of two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum.
§ 5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists between the laws of the two other states, .
it should apply the law of the forum-until someone comes along with a better idea. application of its own law to out-of-state claims in class action suit where 97% of plaintiff-class members were non-residents and 99% of the gas leases in dispute were also out-of-state).
Id.
In addition to the modern approaches discussed in the text
Professors Miller and Crump suggest that the constitutional limits in the Court's recent choice of law decisions in Shutts and Allstate should be interpreted "to limit unreasonable forum shopping and preserve parties' expectations." Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 62. The choice of law principles set forth in this Note's proposed statute, infra Section IV (tortfeasor's reasonable expectations one of three principal factors in choice of law decision), accord with this interpretation of the constitutional parameters of choice of law decisions.
72. The analysis in the text relies primarily on the affirmative grant to Congress under the full faith and credit clause. See also Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 78 (expressing "little doubt that congressional power to enact a choice of law rule exists under the diversity jurisdiction, due process, privileges and immunities, commerce, equal protection, and full faith and credit clauses of the action. The second sentence of the Constitution's full faith and credit clause 73 grants Congress exclusive authority to prescribe the manner in which extraterritorial effect is to be given to the "Acts, Records, and [judicial] Proceedings" of the states."' The general implementing statute passed by the first Congress prescribes that the full faith and credit due a state's acts, records and proceedings is the same as that which "they have by law or usage in the courts of . . . [the rendering] State." '7 5 While "full faith and credit" has proved to be an intelligible standard for the effect to be given to records and judgments that have unambiguous application, its insufficiency as an analytical basis for choice of law decisions-which require a balancing of competing state laws of presumptively equal weight-has led courts to ignore its effect in the conflicts context and to enforce its prescription only as to records and judgments. 6 Constitution").
This Note suggests a structural analysis to elicit the constitutional policies congressional involvement would serve. The Constitution endows all citizens with the right to travel and conduct commerce freely across state lines. An unfortunate consequence of freedom of mobility in modern technological society is the recurring phenomenon of mass torts. It is well settled that the commerce and equal protection clauses empower Congress to enact legislation ameliorating the inequities that varying state laws may impose on those involved in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 51-60 (1982). In this regard, there are few, if any, substantive restraints on Congress' power under the commerce clause. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) .
A statutory solution designed to enhance the judicial system's ability to administer personal injury and wrongful death claims arising from tortious behavior inextricably connected to interstate commerce is therefore an appropriate, albeit novel, exercise of Congress' power to address inherently interstate problems within our federal system. 76. The statute proposed in this Note would require congressional involvement in the process by which extraterritorial effect is to be given to state laws. In this regard, constitutional scholars once disagreed as to whether the Framers intended the word "Acts" to include state decisional as well as statutory law. For two reasons, the ambiguity today appears to have been resolved in favor of an interpretation that places state common law rules within the compass of the word "Acts." First, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern"), disfavors an interpretation that would distinguish between statutory and decisional law, to the exclusion of the latter. Jackson, supra note 74, at 12. Second, the importance of state courts as coequal in their lawmaking authority to state legislatures favors an interpretation that accords equal weight to The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980" (PKPA) is a recent example of congressional action under the full faith and credit clause to enact a national standard where a compelling federal interest is present. The statute was enacted to eliminate the harm to children caused by "child-snatching" by requiring states to give full faith and credit to the custody decrees of another jurisdiction. 8 Like its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act of 1968," 9 the PKPA was adopted to remedy the chaos in interstate custody litigation caused by the Supreme Court's failure to mandate the application of the full faith and credit clause to the custody decrees of sister states. 80 The statute contains a set of uniform principles under which questions regarding the jurisdiction of a court first issuing a decree, and thus by implication its choice of law, are to be resolved.""
The PKPA resolves the full faith and credit issue explicitly by reference to the validity of the jurisdiction of the rendering court. Because the rendering court ordinarily would apply forum law in child custody decree cases, however, the jurisdictional inquiry is equivalent to review of that court's choice of law. 2 Designed to address an interstate problem that the application of state choice of law rules would only exacerbate, the PKPA can be viewed as a recent precedent firmly establishing Congress' ability to legislate in the area of choice of law by issuing a set of uniform standards to be followed in state courts.
Congress should exercise its power where there is a demonstrable need App. 1982) . These guidelines direct a court to consider such factors as the residence of the child on the date of the commencement of the initial proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i) (1982), evidence of mistreatment or abuse of the child, id. at § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii), and the extent to which the best interest of the child was served by the assumption of jurisdiction by the court first issuing the decree, id. at § 1738A(c) (2) in the federal system to provide national solutions to inherently interstate problems. 8 3 Choice of law decisions in mass tort cases constitute an inherently federal problem for two reasons. First, most mass torts arise from interstate economic activity and directly affect citizens from many states. Second, the usefulness and availability of procedural devices created by federal law 8 4 have led litigants to rely almost exclusively upon federal courts for the adjudication of mass tort claims. 8 5 Particularly because the nature of the problem requires something more than a narrowly drawn judicial opinion, Congress is the proper source of federal standards. 8 "
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
To remedy the choice of law problems described in Section I, Congress should enact a law providing:
Whenever state law supplies the rule of decision on an issue in litigation arising from a mass tort, 7 the federal court shall make its
Judge Friendly has written:
For Congress to direct a federal court sitting in State A whether to apply the internal law of State A, B or C, or to use its own judgment which to apply, can well be said to be 'necessary and proper' to enabling federal judges to function, and consistent with the general role of the central government under the Constitution, in a way that prescription of a code of substantive law to supplant the otherwise applicable law of a state is not. Friendly, supra note 52, at 402 (citation omitted). It is important to emphasize that by limiting Congress' role to enacting an essentially procedural rule, see Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 78 n.534 (choice of law rules fairly characterized as procedural), this Note's proposed statute, infra Section IV, does not encroach upon the states' authority to develop substantive bodies of tort law. The favorable law preference of this Note's proposal does not invalidate this distinction. Procedural rules commonly affect substantive results and include implicit value judgments.
84. See Miller & Crump, supra note 9, at 67, 70 (discussing federal courts' superior ability to handle complex, multidistrict litigation); FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20 (joinder) 87. No attempt has been made here to define precisely various terms-e.g., "mass tort," "rule of decision," and "parties similarly situated"-that will determine the statute's application in any particular case. For a general description of the kinds of mass torts this proposal is intended to reach, see supra note 1. The principal criteria that will operate once the statute has been invoked are discussed own decision as to which state's law shall govern the rights and liabilities of all parties similarly situated; in deciding this question, the court shall: i) consider the laws of only those states with contacts to the mass tort such that a defendant could reasonably have foreseen it would be subject to those laws; ii) select from among the laws available the one most favorable to the plaintiffs; and iii) apply the same law to the claims of similarly situated parties.
Analysis of the three primary features of the proposed statute demonstrates the ways in which the statute would promote equitable and efficient mass tort adjudication.
A. A Reasonable Expectations Standard
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 88 a plurality of the Court observed that selection of a state's law comports with due process when it is neither "arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 89 It is arguable that the Court's finding that this standard was satisfied in Hague was based on an affirmance of the forum-and domicile-oriented policies characteristic of modern choice of law rules. 9 0 The hypothetical case in Section II, however, revealed how fidelity to forum and domicile interests contravenes the equity and efficiency objectives of mass tort adjudication. 1 
90.
Id. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality's emphasis on "presence of the plaintiff and the fact that the deceased worked in the forum State").
91. See supra notes 17-49 and accompanying text. The heavy emphasis that interest analysis places on domicile is not, however, entirely misplaced or illogical. A state's interest in issues of liability and measure of damages, which directly affect the welfare of its citizens, is manifest. Offsetting this state interest, however, is the federal interest in achieving equity and efficiency in the adjudication of mass tort claims. Two strains of thought suggest that subordinating state interests to federal interests is acceptable for choice of law decisionmaking in mass tort litigation. First, the discussion of contemporary choice of law doctrine, supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text, demonstrates that state sovereignty is not significantly harmed by such a result. By definition, the resolution of any "true conflict," through either the traditional or a modern approach, subordinates one state's legitimate interest in having its law applied. Further, contemporary solutions to true conflicts-for example, forum law (Currie), see supra note 31, or the "better law" (Leflar), see supra notes 33-34-are not meaningfully attentive to any state's interest. See Chicago Air Crash, 644 F.2d 594, 630 (7th Cir. 1981) (selecting law of less interested forum where "interested" states' laws conflicted).
A second state sovereignty issue concerns the role of the federal court in making the choice of law decision in the first place; that is, while it may be permissible for the states to override each other's interests, it may be improper for federal courts to trump state interests. The discussion of federal authority in the choice of law field under full faith and credit, supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text, addresses this issue and concludes that the requisite federal authority and justification exist. NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 860 (1985) (analyzing Supreme Court's "misconceived insistence that federal and state courts are virtually interchangeable"). the defendant's reasonable expectations regarding the laws that might govern its conduct. 2 A reasonable expectations standard serves a number of equity and efficiency goals. Narrowing the range of substantive rules for consideration reduces the time and resources required of a court making choice of law decisions in a mass tort suit. By greatly increasing the predictability of the applicable law, this prescription both facilitates the settlement of claims and encourages defendants to insure themselves adequately against losses that could conceivably arise under the laws of states affected by their activities. Preparation by defendants for risk of loss furthers the compensation and loss-spreading policies of tort law and thus benefits both defendants and plaintiffs. Finally, subjecting defendants to only those laws they might reasonably have expected would govern their conduct better comports with the due process standards required of choice of law decisions. 
B. The Law Most Favorable to Plaintiffs
A principle common to most contemporary choice of law methods states that choice of law decisions should further the policies underlying a particular field of law. 4 Insofar as two primary policy objectives of modern tort law are deterrence and compensation, 95 a rule requiring selection of the law most favorable to the victims of mass torts is consistent with this well-established norm. 96 The need for swift and sure compensation is 92. Under the proposed statute's reasonable expectations standard, the transferee court in this Note's hypothetical case, supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text, would have considered the laws of States B, C, and E. The defendant manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen that accidents involving the use of its planes might occur in the states of departure (B) and destination (C). See Washington, D.C. Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. 333, 338 (D.D.C. 1983) (manufacturer "had to foresee that its small, short-haul 737 aircraft would be used for departures from Washington National Airport"). Further, a corporate manufacturer would always expect to be subject to the substantive laws of the states where it is incorporated (E), maintains its principal place of business (E), and manufactures its product (B). 33, 88 (1978) ("To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.").
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(e) (1971) (among factors relevant to choice of law are "basic policies underlying the particular field of law").
95. In less obvious ways, a choice of law rule requiring selection of the law most favorable to plaintiffs enhances the efficiency of a judicial response to mass disasters as well. Successful collective adjudication requires the maintenance of an identity of interests among those with similar claims. The knowledge that their claims will be governed by the most favorable of available laws removes incentives for individual litigants to opt out and pursue their claims individually." Thus, by crystallizing the common interests of mass accident victims, the proposed statute's most-favorable-law prescription leads to the realization of the efficiencies offered by collective adjudication.
C. A Single Law for Like Claims
The directive that a court apply the same rule of law to the claims of similarly situated parties releases federal courts from their obligation under current law to follow the choice of law rules of the states in which they sit. 99 The judicial economies to be gained from permitting a federal court presiding over mass tort litigation to sidestep the morass of ambiguous, biased, and conflicting state choice of law rules are manifest.' 00 More important, by ensuring that cases involving common questions of fact raise common questions of law, the proposed statute removes a powerful deterrent to the increased use of the various procedures for collective adjudication available under current law."' In this way, the statute encourages efficiency for the judicial system, for litigants, and for society through the collective adjudication of common claims arising from a single set of facts.
1 0 2 Selection of a single substantive standard serves equity considerations as well. By reducing the ex ante probability that a defendant will be subject to different standards of liability, 03 the statute minimizes uncertainty in the articulation of standards of conduct for mass tortfeasors 1 0 4 By eliminating the ex post application of more than one substantive standard, it also avoids inconsistency in the burdens those with identical claims must meet in order to recover. Finally, the collective adjudication encouraged by the statute's "same law" prescription avoids the threat that individualized adjudication under diverse laws poses to the equitable allocation of potentially limited compensation funds.' 0 5
V. CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to stimulate a reappraisal of choice of law doctrine at the state and federal levels in light of the singularly multistate features of mass tort litigation. To restrict a federal court to the choice of law rules of a state court system infrequently, if ever, called upon to make choice of law decisions of such magnitude and complexity amounts to an inversion of the rationale and procedures that assign the bulk of mass tort litigation to federal courts in the first place. Congress possesses the express authority under the full faith and credit clause to prescribe laws determining the extraterritorial effect to be given to state laws. In order to restore faith in the judicial system's ability to manage mass tort claims, Congress should use that power to enact a statute enabling and directing federal courts presiding over multidistrict mass tort litigation to make choice of law decisions consonant with the equity and efficiency principles of collective adjudication.
